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 1 
 
 
Harmonisation by Example: European Laws against Unfair Commercial Practices  
 
 
 
 
The European Union is often presented as disunited and confused about it goals.  While 
this perspective may be an apt description of the politics surrounding reforms to the 
governing treaties, it overlooks some of the important achievements of the European 
Community in laying the foundations for a competitive single market.  In particular, 
increasingly comprehensive consumer protection measures are gradually transforming the 
legal framework that regulates everyday transactions in all the Member States.  The 
boldest initiative enacted so far is the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive 2005.
1
  This 
legislation creates uniform rules to govern all marketing practices which are designed to 
induce consumers to purchase goods and services.  The regulation controls misleading 
advertising, false claims about products and services, deceptive pricing, high pressure 
sales techniques, and similar sharp practices.  The Directive demonstrates an evolving 
confidence and clear strategic approach shared by the Commission, the Council of 
Ministers, and the European Parliament.
 2
  Even more ambitious in some respects is the 
next European legislation in the pipeline: the proposed Consumer Rights Directive.
3
  
Although this latest proposal may be presented as a consolidation of more narrowly 
focused existing European directives concerning amongst other matters consumer 
guarantees and unfair terms,
4
 the sum is greater than the parts, because the draft directive 
envisages a comprehensive law governing consumer contracts for the purchase of goods 
and services.  But will this new comprehensive European legislation succeed in its goal 
of harmonising the law of consumer protection across Europe in order to promote 
consumer confidence in the single market? 
One persistent reason to doubt that European measures will succeed in their goal 
of uniform laws is the obstacle presented by wide divergences in national traditions in 
law and regulation.
5
  To implement consumer directives, each Member State has to fit 
                                                 
1
 Dir. 2005/29 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-
to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, 
Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and 
Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ L 149/22, 11.6.2005.  
Unless otherwise stated, all references to Articles below refer to this Directive. 
2
 See Commission, EU Policy Strategy 2007-2013: Empowering Consumers, Enhancing their Welfare, 
Effectively Protecting Them, Brussels, 13.3.2007, COM(2007) 99 final. 
3
 Com (2008) 614/3, 8/10/2008.   
4
 Dir. 93/13 on unfair terms in consumer contracts [1993] OJ L95/29; Dir. 1999/44 on certain aspects of the 
sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees [1999] OJ L 171/12.  
5
 The possibility and desirability of uniform private laws in Europe, given the existing diversity, has been 
much debated in recent years, beginning with the controversy about convergence: e.g. B.S. Markesinis (ed), 
Gradual Convergence: Foreign Ideas, Foreign Influences, and English Law on the Eve of the 21
st
 Century 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); P. Legrand, ‘European Legal Systems are Not Converging’ 
(1996) 45 ICLQ 52; P. Legrand, ‘Against a European Civil Code’ (1997) 60 M L R 44; T. Wilhelmsson, E. 
Paunio and A. Pohjolainen (eds), Private Law and the Many Cultures of Europe (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 2007); O. Lando, ‘Can Europe Build Unity of Civil Law while Respecting Diversity?’ (2006) 
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them into their existing regulatory and private law schemes.  Officials and judges 
interpret the new laws in the light of national traditions and the context into which the 
European measures are inserted.  It is not difficult to foresee that despite the harmonising 
efforts of the Directive, differences between national laws and practice will persist, and 
indeed that new divergences will arise.
6
   Acknowledging that such problems exist, the 
European Commission has proposed that what is required, in addition to a clarification 
and consolidation of the existing legislation, is the development of a ‘Common Frame of 
Reference’, which would provide common principles, concepts, and guidance for courts 
when interpreting legislation that implements Directives that affect private law.
7
   
One reason why consumer protection directives have in the past only achieved 
patchy harmonisation has been their limited ambition of only setting minimum standards.  
Member States have been permitted to retain their existing laws in so far as they provide 
superior protection for consumers.
8
  This flexibility tolerates considerable divergence 
between national laws.  For instance, the control of unfair terms in consumer contracts 
does not apply according to the Directive to transparent terms concerning the ‘main 
subject matter of the contract nor to the adequacy of the price or remuneration’.9 The 
minimum standard of the Directive permits national legislation to omit this restriction on 
the scope of the law, with the possible implication in some jurisdictions that an unfair 
price might be regarded as an unfair term, even if the term is transparent.
10
  Another 
reason for the persistence of differences between national laws in the context of 
consumer law is the narrow, sector specific focus of many Directives, or their only partial 
regulation of a particular field.  Previous Directives have been confined, for instance, to 
particular marketing techniques such as doorstep sales,
11
 or to narrow market sectors such 
as package holidays.
12
  Similarly, the consumer guarantees Directive, though addressing 
some of the principal concerns of consumers when they are disappointed with products 
which they have purchased, was certainly not comprehensive in its coverage of legal 
issues.  For instance, though it stresses the need for a right to repair of the goods, it 
                                                                                                                                                 
Europa e diritto privato 1; T. Wilhelmsson, ‘The Ethical Pluralism of Late Modern Europe and 
Codification of European Contract Law’, in J. Smits (ed), The Need for a European Contract Law: 
Empirical and Legal Perspectives (Gronigen: Europa Law Publishing, 2005) 121; H. Collins, The 
European Civil Code: The Way Forward (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) 124.   
6
 G. Teubner, ‘Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends Up in New 
Divergences’ (1998) 61 Modern Law Review 11. 
7
 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, A More Coherent 
European Contract Law: An Action Plan, Brussels, 12.2.2003, COM(2003) 68 final; Communication from 
the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, European Contract Law and the Revision of 
the acquis: The Way Forward, Brussels, 11.10.2004, COM(2004) 651 final. 
8
 E.g. Art.8(2) Dir. 1999/44, above n 4, ‘Member States may adopt or maintain in force more stringent 
provisions, compatible with the Treaty in the field covered by this Directive, to ensure a higher level of 
consumer protection.’ 
9
 Art. 4(1) Dir. 93/13, above n. 4. 
10
 E.B. Capdevila and A. Gimenéz, ‘Unfair Terms in Contracts with Consumers in Spanish Law: 
Interpretation of the General Standard of Fairness and Effects of the List of Unfair Terms [2006/2007] 8 
(2/3) Contemporary Issues in Law 200, 207; K.N. Christodoulou, ‘Standard Contract Terms in Greece’ 
[2006/2007] 8 (2/3) Contemporary Issues in Law 134, 137. 
11
 Dir. 85/577 to protect the consumer in respect of contracts negotiated away from business premises 
[1985] OJ L372/31.  
12
 Dir. 90/314 on package travel [1990] OJ L158/59. 
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contains no explicit reference to a remedy in compensatory damages for non-conforming 
goods.
13
   
In these two respects, the Directive on Unfair Commercial Practices differs 
significantly from the earlier consumer law Directives. First, the legislation provides 
comprehensive rules to prohibit unfair trading practices throughout Europe.  Such unfair 
practices may include misleading statements and advertising, aggressive selling 
techniques, prevarication and obstruction in the face of complaints, and, potentially, all 
the other tricks and devices used by dishonest traders to manipulate consumers’ 
purchasing decisions.  As well this broad coverage of all unfair commercial practices, the 
Directive differs from legislation during the past 20 years,
14
 secondly, because it requires 
full harmonisation or uniformity of national laws in accordance with its principles and 
rules, not merely conformity to minimum standards.  In combination, these features 
reveal that the Directive seeks to pre-empt national law in the whole field of business 
practices aimed at inducing consumers to purchase goods and services.  The proposed 
Consumer Rights Directive shares this character of providing comprehensive rules of full 
harmonisation.   
Will this effort to pre-empt national laws succeed in achieving uniform laws 
throughout Europe?  Even if all the Member States properly implement the Directive, 
perhaps in many cases simply by copying out its provisions verbatim, will this measure 
achieve uniformity in practice, or will the differences in language, traditions, 
philosophies, and practice continue to provoke divergences in interpretations and 
applications of the law?   
The Directive on Unfair Commercial Practices strives hard to provide precise 
guidance to national authorities and courts about the scope of its provisions.  It employs 
all the implements in the legal tool-box to communicate precise requirements to national 
legislators and courts.  As well as using general principles and standards to determine its 
scope of application, it uses more precise rules and standards that apply to particular 
types of marketing techniques.  Furthermore, this Directive employs unusually detailed 
definitions of many of its key concepts.  These definitions are striking for their avoidance 
of traditional legal concepts drawn from national traditions.  They create new concepts to 
which a special European meaning should be attributed, thereby reducing the risk that 
they might be interpreted as synonymous with concepts in national legal systems.  In 
addition, the Directive creates a lengthy ‘black-list’ of prohibited commercial practices, 
which comprises simple, one sentence long, descriptions of unlawful marketing practices.  
Uniform practice throughout Europe is therefore sought not only by the application of 
common principles, standards and rules, the phrases in which often have precise technical 
meanings, but also by the application of examples.    
The following discussion considers the likely degree of success of this bold 
initiative from Europe to harmonise the law of the internal market with respect to the 
marketing practices of businesses aimed at consumers.  We consider in detail the impact 
on United Kingdom (UK) law of the implementation of the Directive by the Consumer 
Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008, which entered into force on 26
th
 May 
                                                 
13
 M.C. Bianca and S. Grundmann (eds), EU Sales Directive Commentary (Antwerp:Intersentia, 2002) 175. 
14
 The most significant prior instance of full harmonisation is the much older directive on product liability, 
Dir. 85/374. 
 4 
2008.
15
 This particular example demonstrates the radical character of the Directive in its 
quest to find a way to harmonise the laws of European Member States.  For instance, to 
satisfy the requirement of full harmonisation, these U.K. Regulations necessarily enacted 
a major spring cleaning of the existing national consumer law.  Schedule 4 to the 
Regulations refers to 40 items of primary legislation and 36 statutory instruments which 
had to be repealed or revised.  Repealed legislation includes some cornerstones of 
domestic consumer protection law: the Trade Descriptions Act 1968 sections 1(1), 5-10, 
13-15, the Consumer Protection Act 1987 sections 20-26 (misleading price indications), 
and the Control of Misleading Advertising Regulations 1988.
16
  The list of repeals also 
includes some quaint items, such as the Fraudulent Mediums Act 1951, a measure to 
catch persons who, with intent to deceive, pretend to be in touch with dead relatives by 
spiritualistic methods.  The UK Government reported that the repeals include all the most 
important laws governing the regulation of commercial practices, judged by reference to 
the fact that they accounted for over 95% of the prosecutions in the field.
17
 The content of 
the UK Regulations tracks closely the structure and words of the underlying Directive.  
The principal differences arise from the need to specify repeals of existing domestic 
legislation and to provide the details of the methods of enforcement.   
Through an examination of the national implementing legislation, we will try to 
assess how successful this European initiative will prove in achieving full harmonisation 
across the Member States.  This note examines the principal provisions of the 
Regulations and some of the controversial questions that they address.  In particular, we 
consider the significance for UK law of two major innovations: the creation of two new 
broad offences of ‘misleading omissions’ and ‘aggressive marketing practices’.  We shall 
also consider the potential impact of the Directive on the private law of obligations, 
which may prove to be the Achilles heel for the project of harmonising the law of unfair 
marketing practices.   
 
 
1 The European Debate 
 
Such a major piece of European legislation was not enacted, of course, without debates 
between the Member States.
18
  When the European Commission first proposed a 
Directive,
19
 the UK government voiced some of the loudest objections.
20
  It was 
                                                 
 
15
 SI 2008/1277.  Unless otherwise stated, all references to Regulations below refer to these Regulations.  
16
 S.I. 1988/915. 
17
 DTI, Government Response to the Consultation Paper on Implementing the Unfair Commercial 
Practices Directive (December 2006) URN 06/2121: ‘Following further consideration, and taking into 
account the responses received to the consultation, the Government will repeal provisions in 22 of the 29 
laws affected. 13 of these laws will be repealed outright; 9 in part. This represents repeals in 75% of the 
laws considered. These 22 arguably include the most important laws considered, as they account for over 
95% of prosecutions taken under all 29 between 2000-2005 (as notified to the OFT).’ 
18
 For discussion, see: H. Collins (ed), The Forthcoming EC Directive on Unfair Commercial Practices: 
Contract, Consumer and Competition Law Implications (The Hague/London: Kluwer Law International, 
2004).  S. Weatherill and U. Bernitz (eds), The Regulation of Unfair Commercial Practices under EC 
Directive 2005/29: New Rules and New Techniques, (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007). 
19
 Commission, Green Paper on European Union Consumer Protection, 2 October 2001, COM(2001) 531. 
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suggested the proposed law containing a general clause, such as a duty to bargain in good 
faith or to trade fairly, was both dangerous and unnecessary.  It was dangerous because it 
was so vague.  Businesses would not know what was - and what was not - lawful 
commercial behaviour.  The legal risks in trading under such a vague standard would, it 
was alleged, deter commerce and thereby harm the growth of the internal market.  At the 
same time, it was asserted that the proposed Directive was unnecessary, at least in the 
UK.  Domestic consumer law already contained extensive prohibitions against unfair 
commercial practices, such as misleading statements and advertising.  If there were any 
gaps in this legislation, a point strongly asserted by consumer interest groups and other 
professionals,
21
 these could be better filled by tailored provisions that addressed 
particular problems rather than by some sweeping general clause.
22
   
But the pressure for harmonisation at European level was compelling.  In 
particular, the German government was in the process of reforming its domestic law and 
it wanted to generalise these new rules across Europe.  It could point to the risk, shared 
by other Member States with high levels of consumer protection laws, that these national 
measures might be undermined or avoided by the use of unfair commercial practices 
emanating from traders across the border.  It would be hard, for instance, for national 
authorities to challenge misleading marketing statements to domestic consumers, such as 
a claim that using a carbolic smoke ball prevents influenza, if those statements were 
produced by a trader in a different jurisdiction where such statements were lawful.   To 
promote consumer confidence to shop abroad, particularly through the emerging Internet 
markets, a substantial majority of Member States agreed that it was necessary to have 
strong, uniform laws that would weed out rogue traders wherever they might be located.
23
  
In many countries the rules on marketing do not distinguish between consumer 
protection measures and unfair conduct by a business that harms competitors.  Indeed, an 
unfair commercial practice such as misleading advertising, if effective, should both harm 
consumers and damage the profits of competitors.  In line with its domestic legislation, 
the German government pressed for rules to govern unfair commercial practices, whether 
or not those practices were aimed at harming consumers or competitors.
24
   Application to 
competition between businesses was possible, because the Treaty basis for the Directive 
had to be the internal market provision of Article 95EC in order to achieve full 
                                                                                                                                                 
20
 Department of Trade and Industry, Green Paper on EU Consumer Protection: UK Government Response 
(London, Department of Trade and Industry, 2002); see H. Collins, ‘EC Regulation of Unfair Commercial 
Practices’, in Collins, above n 18, 1. 
21
 National Consumer Council, The Case for a General Duty – Evidence to support the NCC’s campaign 
for a General Duty not to Trade Unfairly (London: NCC, 2002); Department of Trade and Industry, Report 
of DTI Workshop on the Evidence for a “general duty to trade fairly”.  (London: DTI, July 2003) 
22
 See, for instance, the rejection of an amendment to the Enterprise Bill that provided for a prohibition 
against unfair commercial practices: House of Commons, Standing Committee B, 23 April 2002, column 
248. 
23
 Commission, Follow-up Communication to the Green Paper on EU Consumer Protection, 11 June 2002, 
COM(2002) 289 reported support from 12 Member States for a ‘framework directive’.    
24
 The German unfair competition act of 2004 retained the approach that consolidates unfair competition 
harmful to competitors as well as consumers: J. Stuyck, ‘The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive and its 
Consequences for the Regulation of Sales Promotion and the Law of Unfair Competition’ in Weatherill and 
Bernitz above n 18, 159, 169. 
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harmonisation.
25
 Owing probably to its political origins within the Commission in the 
sphere of consumer protection, however, the Directive was confined to consumer 
protection rather than extending to unfair competition between businesses.  As a practical 
matter, the coverage of the Directive may prove almost as broad: if a trader markets or 
promotes products for sale to consumers in a way which creates confusion with any 
products, trade marks, trade names or other distinguishing marks of a competitor, this 
practice will be regarded as unfair.
26
 In the UK, some of the prior national legislation 
such as the Trade Description Act 1968 applied to deceptions practiced against other 
businesses as well, so it was necessary to re-enact those laws in a separate statutory 
instrument.
27
   
Perhaps the deepest disagreement between the Member States during the passage 
of the Directive concerned the use of full harmonisation.
28
  Supporters of consumer 
protection measures were concerned that some Member States might be forced to reduce 
their levels of protection.  For this reason, Denmark and Sweden ultimately opposed the 
Directive.
29
  A second ground for opposition to full harmonisation was a fear that the 
legislation would lock the whole of Europe into a particular model of regulation of 
marketing practices, which would be both hard to shift and would prohibit further 
experimentation by Member States.
30
  This concern forms part of a more general 
suspicion of the rigidity of codified laws, particularly when their transnational operation 
effectively prevents rapid reform.
31
  The Directive does permit some time-limited 
preservation of national consumer laws, provided that they provide better protection for 
consumers and were measures designed to implement previous EC Directives.  But even 
such retentions may be challenged by the Commission as disproportionate measures.
32
  
The Directive is also stated to apply only a minimum standard for transactions in 
financial services and immoveable property, thereby permitting Member States to retain 
                                                 
25
 The Recitals in the preamble to the Directive refer to the consumer protection dimension of the internal 
market in Art.153, but Art. 153 (5) limits consumer initiatives to minimum harmonisation and there is also 
doubt about the question whether on its own Art.153 provides a sufficient legal basis for such qualified 
majority measures: H-W. Micklitz and S. Weatherill, ‘Consumer Policy in the European Community: 
Before and After Maastricht’ (1993) Journal of Consumer Policy 285; J. Stuyck, ‘European Consumer Law 
After the Treaty of Amsterdam: Consumer Policy in or Beyond the Internal Market?’ (2000) 37 Common 
Market Law Review 367. 
26
 Dir Art 6(2)(a); Annex 1, para. 13.  Reg. 5(3), Sched. 1, para. 13. 
27
 The Business Protection from Misleading Marketing Regulations 2008 SI 2008/1276; Dir.2006/114 
concerning misleading and comparative advertising OJ L 376, 27.12.2006, p.21.  
28
 H. Collins, ‘The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive’ (2005) 1 European Review of Contract Law 
417, 429-432. 
29
 Competitiveness Council, political agreement, Brussels, 25 May 2004, 9667/04, Annex 2, para. 4. 
Similar fears have been expressed about the proposed Consumer Rights Directive, above n 3, which, by 
becoming full harmonisation, may remove some rights of consumers in the UK, such as the right of 
rejection of non-conforming goods. 
30
 G. Howells and T. Wilhelmsson, ‘EC Consumer Law: Has it Come of Age?’ (2003) 9 European Law 
Journal 370; G. Howells, ‘European Consumer Law- the minimal and maximal harmonisation debate and 
pro independent consumer law competence,’ in S. Grundmann and J. Stuyck (eds), An Academic Green 
Paper on European Contract Law (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002) 73.    
31
 T. Wilhelmsson, ‘Private Law in the EU: Harmonised or Fragmented Europeanisation?’ (2002) 10 
European Review of Private Law 77.   
32
 Art. 3(5); Collins, above n 28, 431. 
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their existing, sometimes more protective, laws in those fields.
33
  Apart from conceding 
these exceptions, the Commission pressed hard for full harmonisation against the 
alternatives such as minimum harmonisation, perhaps combined with the ‘country of 
origin’ principle.  In so doing, it clearly prioritised the competitiveness of the internal 
market over concerns either for conserving even higher levels of consumer protection in 
some countries or for reserving scope for national innovation.   
In a reference for a preliminary ruling, the European Court of Justice reinforced 
the mandatory and pre-emptive quality of the Directive.
34
  It declared that a Belgium law 
that prohibited the marketing practice of ‘combined offers’ (where the acquisition of one 
product is tied to the acquisition of other products) was contrary to the Directive because 
the national law absolutely prohibited such practices, whereas the Directive requires the 
national legislation merely to require an assessment of the practice according to the 
various definitions of unfair commercial practices.  Hence the Belgium law should have 
imitated the approach of the U.K. in respect of the prohibition against the misuse of the 
phrase ‘by royal appointment’ contrary to s.12 Trade Descriptions Act 1968, an offence 
which is preserved, but is committed only if the conduct  also satisfies the requirements 
of being an unfair commercial practice under the Regulations. 
Having lost the debate over the need for the proposed Directive, the UK 
government concentrated its efforts on improving the content of the legislation.  Instead 
of a positive duty to trade fairly, as originally mooted, the Directive creates a negative 
duty not to trade unfairly.  The central principle or general clause of Regulation 3.-(1) 
states boldly: ‘Unfair commercial practices are prohibited…’  This shift to negative 
terminology fits more comfortably into the traditional British liberal perspective on the 
state that what is not prohibited is therefore permitted, thereby avoiding the appearance of 
the imposition on businesses of a vague positive duty to behave in ways dictated by the 
government.      
As well as the general clause, the Directive achieves greater specificity by the 
introduction of a more detailed description of the most likely forms of unfair commercial 
practices in Articles 6-9: the prohibitions against misleading practices, misleading 
omissions, and aggressive practices.  In addition, following the pattern set by Swiss law, 
Spanish law and the German legal reform, the Directive includes an Annex that provides 
a lengthy description of commercial practices which ‘in all circumstances shall be 
regarded as unfair’.35  Given the wide disparity of the national laws of Member States,36 
                                                 
33
 Art 3(9). 
34
 Joined Cases C-261/07 TB-NAB NV v Total Belgium and C-299/07 Galatea BVBA v Sonoma Magazines 
Belgium NV, 23 April 2009.  
35
 Art.5.5, referring to Annex 1. 
36
 The Commission obtained detailed information about the laws from a large research team led by H-W. 
Micklitz, which was put on the web: 
http:europa.eu.int/comm./consumers/policy/developments/fair_comm_pract/.  See also: F. Henning-
Bodewig, Unfair Competition Law: European Union and Member States (The Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 2006); R. W. de Very, Towards a European Unfair Competition Law: A Clash Between 
Legal Families (Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2006).  Another report obtained by the Commission, led 
by R. Schulze and H. Schulte-Nocke, investigated the potential impact of the Directive on national laws: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/consumers/cons_int/safe_shop/fair_bus_pract/impact_assessment_en.pdf.  For 
an assessment of the likely impact in the UK: R. Bradgate, R. Brownsword, C. Twigg-Flessner, The Impact 
of Adopting a Duty to Trade Fairly, a report prepared for the Department of Trade and Industry by Institute 
for Commercial law Studies, University of Sheffield (July, 2003). 
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agreement on all these detailed provisions was a considerable achievement.  It is expected 
that these specific rules and examples will cover the vast majority of cases and that it will 
be rare to have recourse to the general prohibition against unfair commercial practices.  
As well as the general clause in Regulation 3, the UK Regulations therefore include both 
three more specific (though still broad) prohibitions – the ‘mini general clauses’ of 
misleading actions (Regulation 5), misleading omissions (Regulation 6), and aggressive 
commercial practices (Regulation 7) – and a ‘black list’ of 31 factually described 
practices that are automatically regarded as unfair practices (Schedule 1).    
From an original position of scepticism with respect to the value of an initiative 
containing a general clause, the UK government has, after all, found merit in this 
European law.  The legislation has been presented by the Ministry of Business Enterprise 
and Regulatory Reform (BERR) as a desirable modernisation and simplification of the 
law.  It will be ‘better regulation’, because it will be shorter and state general standards 
rather than endless complex detail.  ‘This follows the Government’s belief that the 
existing consumer protection framework is complicated and fragmented and does not 
reflect the requirements of a simplified and modern legal framework’.37   The principal 
benefits of the Directive and the Regulations are perceived to lie in the way uniform laws 
should make it easier for UK businesses to market their products to consumers in other 
Member States without falling foul of local marketing regulations, whilst at the same 
time contributing to a high standard of consumer protection.   
 
2 The General Clause 
 
Regulation 3 (3) A commercial practice is unfair if- 
(a) it contravenes the requirements of professional diligence; and 
(b) it materially distorts or is likely to materially distort the economic behaviour 
of the average consumer with regard to the product. 
 
Does this general clause in Regulation 3(3) have a significant role to play in the 
application of the new law?  The legislation provides that there is no need to invoke the 
general clause in Regulation 3(3) if a more particular provision is applicable.  The ‘mini-
general clauses’ and the ‘black list’ are self-standing offences, so that when they apply to 
the facts of a case, no reference to the general clause is required.  Given that the black list 
identifies the most common forms of deception and trickery in its list of 31 items and that 
the mini general clauses have a wide range, it seems likely that the general clause will 
rarely be needed.  The case for having a general clause is to provide a means by which 
enforcement authorities can attack novel forms of unfair commercial practices that have 
not been foreseen by the legislation.   The general clause is supposed to make the 
legislation ‘future-proof’.  The prior UK law also had a mechanism for achieving this 
goal in Part II of the Fair Trading Act 1973.  In theory, this legislation enabled the Office 
of Fair Trading (OFT) to introduce new statutory instruments to counter novel kinds of 
unfair commercial practices.  In practice, however, the mechanism proved cumbersome 
and fell into disuse.  It proved simpler for the OFT to publicise a new abusive marketing 
technique and then ask the relevant Minister to do something about it in the form of a 
                                                 
37
 DTI, Government Response to the Consultation Paper on Implementing the Unfair Commercial Practices 
Directive (December 2006) URN 06/2121.   
 9 
statutory instrument.  The general clause in Regulation 3(3) should remove the need to 
create fresh regulations, provided that the impugned marketing technique falls within its 
scope.  We should recognise, however, that the existence of the general clause opens the 
door to the possibility that when a novel unfair marketing technique comes along, which 
does not appear to be covered by the more specific rules and examples, national courts 
may differ in their applications of the general clause.   
It is worth considering, therefore, how far the European legislator has been able to 
communicate precise standards through the general clause.  In specifying the conditions 
to govern its scope, the general clause introduces the concepts of the breach of the 
requirements of ‘professional diligence’, and ‘material distortion’ of economic behaviour 
of the ‘average consumer’.  In accordance with the Directive, the Regulations provide 
detailed definitions of these three concepts.
38
  Some of these concepts are repeated in the 
mini general clauses, thus revealing how they inform the underlying philosophy and 
purpose of the legislation.   
 
Professional Diligence 
 
The concept of ‘professional diligence means the standard of special skill and care which 
a trader may reasonably be expected to exercise towards consumers which is 
commensurate with either- (a) honest market practice in the trader’s field of activity, or 
(b) the general principle of good faith in the trader’s field of activity.’39  The concepts of 
special skill and care, honesty, and good faith are not further defined.  Despite its brevity, 
this definition contains many intertwining strands.  Its first element comprises the notion 
that ‘professionals’ (a poor translation of the French concept that includes all kinds of 
businesses) owe a duty to bargain and to behave with care when dealing with consumers.  
The standard of care itself is fixed by a combination of the reasonable expectations of 
consumers and the idea that the trader should possess the appropriate skills for that line of 
business.  But this standard of care is further specified by the minimum requirement that 
it must be either honest or comply with standards of good faith.  In trying to define this 
concept of professional diligence, the legislature is struggling with two problems.  On the 
one hand, it wants the standard of care to reflect the appropriate level of expertise for the 
trader:  if the business holds itself out as having special expertise, the reasonable 
expectation of the consumer rises, and so accordingly the standard of care should be more 
demanding.  On the other hand, the legislation does not want to endorse the low level of 
expectations which consumers may have when dealing with certain kinds of notorious 
rogue traders – perhaps used car salesmen or organisers of prize lotteries.  Thus the 
sliding scale of reasonable care may be adjusted according to the ‘field of activity’, but 
there is an attempt to place a floor on acceptable behaviour by reference to honesty or 
good faith.  The concept of professional diligence resembles the private law concept of 
‘culpa in contrahendo’ by its attempt to combine the private law ideas of a duty to 
bargain with care and a duty to bargain in good faith into a single formulation.  Has the 
attempt to impose a clear minimum standard on acceptable behaviour by use of the novel 
concept of professional diligence been successful?   
                                                 
38
 Reg. 2(1). 
39
 Reg.2(1). 
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If a rogue trader uses selling techniques that avoid outright dishonesty, but 
nevertheless seem misleading and rather sharp practice, will this conduct be caught by the 
general clause?  The official guidance issued by BERR and the OFT argues that ‘poor 
current practice that is widespread in an industry/sector cannot amount to an acceptable 
objective standard’ that meets the requirement of the reasonable expectation of the 
consumer.
40
  This interpretation of the Regulations assumes that the concept of honesty 
has an objective element that sets a standard of care that may rise above current market 
practice.  Although that view is likely to be correct with respect to the alternative concept 
of good faith, at least if it is awarded the meaning it usually has in European private law 
systems, it is hard to interpret the concept of honesty in other than its common legal 
meaning, which usually expresses a strong subjective element.  Dishonest behaviour 
requires the person whose conduct is being impugned to appreciate that his behaviour is 
deviant or falling below expected standards.  If a business merely follows standard 
market practices used by competitors, an unscrupulous trader may think this conduct is 
honest enough.  This concern that the standard of honesty may permit low standards of 
care by reference to subjective beliefs is further strengthened by the enforcement 
provisions in the Regulations.  Unlike the strict liability rules of the remainder of the 
Regulations, in order to obtain a conviction for a criminal offence under the general 
clause, the prosecution must prove mens rea in the form of intention or recklessness.
41
  
This reinforcement of a subjective approach is, however, slightly diluted because a trader 
will be regarded as reckless if he engages in a commercial practice without regard to 
whether the practice contravenes the requirements of professional diligence, whether or 
not the trader actually believes that the practice might contravene those requirements.
42
  
Even so, the wording of the general clause does seem to allow considerable scope for 
traders to insist that their practices, though perhaps rather sharp or unscrupulous, avoid 
dishonesty and are so common in the line of business that consumers have no reasonable 
expectation of any different behaviour.   
If that rather pessimistic view of the meaning of professional diligence is correct, 
it tends to confirm the view that the general clause merely provides a safety net behind 
the more particular provisions, one with a rather large mesh.  Furthermore, the 
ambiguities in the concepts of good faith and honesty seem to provide considerable scope 
for divergence between national legal systems.  It is worth noting, however, one final 
route for tightening up the meaning of the clause, at least at a national level.  There is an 
incentive for honest traders to create and subscribe to a code of practice in the hope of 
influencing or even determining what a court might regard as honest practice, which will 
simultaneously protect them from criticism under the general clause whilst flushing out 
rogue traders who do not sign up to the code of practice.
43
 
 
Average Consumer 
 
                                                 
40
 BERR/OFT, Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading: Guidance on the UK Regulations (May 2008) 
implementing the Unfair Commercial Practices Directive (2008) para.10.5. 
41
 Reg. 8(1).   
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 Reg.8(2). 
43
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The second concept in the general clause regarding ‘the distortion of the economic 
behaviour of an average consumer’ provoked considerable controversy.  The most 
contentious problem concerned the definition of an ‘average’ consumer, a concept that is 
also employed in the three mini general clauses.
44
  Since rogue traders may prey upon 
vulnerable groups, the question arose whether the concept should represent an average 
person who would not be influenced by suspicious and misleading practices or should the 
law protect the gullible?   In its interpretation of previous European Directives in 
consumer law, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) had favoured the concept of the 
average consumer, who is presumed to be reasonably well informed, reasonably 
observant and circumspect, though taking into account social, cultural and linguistic 
factors.
45
  Critics of the proposed Directive were concerned that such a concept of the 
average consumer would leave vulnerable groups unprotected against deceptive and 
aggressive sales practices.  Following proposed amendments by the European Parliament, 
the Directive modified the standard of the average consumer in two respects.  In the first 
place, where the commercial practice is directed to a particular group, the concept of an 
average consumer should be read as the average member of that particular group.
46
  
Secondly, where a clearly identifiable group is particularly vulnerable to a commercial 
practice by reason of infirmity, age or credulity, and where the practice is likely to distort 
only the behaviour of that group, the reference to the average consumer should be 
understood as referring to the average of that group.
47
   Suppose, for instance, a credit 
business places advertisements in local papers offering in a misleading way low interest 
rate terms for home loans to those urgently needing to re-mortgage property in order to 
avoid higher interest rates that commence at the end of a period of a fixed rate loan.  Such 
an advertisement is clearly directed at a particular group and so falls within the first 
exception to the average consumer test.  It is less clear that it falls into the second 
exception, unless it can be argued that this identifiable group of sub-prime borrowers is 
likely to be particularly credulous.  A clearer example of the second group would be 
advertisements that target persons with a particular illness or disability in order to sell 
some new alleged wonder drug.
48
  One welcome effect of these new rules may be to 
place a curb on some of the emotive advertising techniques aimed at children and young 
people, who do not yet have the experience to know that if it sounds too good to be true, 
it is.  The concept of the ‘average consumer’ in the Directive now seems sufficiently 
precise to achieve a high level of uniformity, because the legislators have sensibly built 
on and articulated further the notions developed originally by the ECJ, rather than starting 
afresh. 
 
Material Distortion 
                                                 
44
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prohibitions against misleading and aggressive practices. 
47
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48
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The final requirement under the general clause is that the commercial practice should be 
likely ‘to materially distort the consumer’s economic behaviour’.  In the Regulations, this 
requirement is further defined as ‘appreciably to impair the average consumer’s ability to 
make an informed decision thereby causing him to take a transactional decision that he 
would not have taken otherwise’.49  Much the same phrase referring to a transactional 
decision that would not have been taken otherwise applies also to the three mini general 
clauses.  This definition (drawn from the Directive) is odd, because it seems to assume 
that the only cause of a material distortion of economic behaviour is conduct that impairs 
the consumer’s access to accurate information, whereas other factors such as aggressive 
sales techniques may disrupt the operation of a competitive market.   The Directive might 
have been clearer without this particular definition.
50
 A ‘transactional decision’ is defined 
extremely broadly to include not only a decision to purchase goods and services, but also 
the selection of the terms of purchase, whether to make a purchase with this trader at all, 
whether to pay a bill, whether to cancel the contract, and whether to exercise any 
contractual rights.
51
  The purpose of the requirement of ‘material distortion’, which only 
appears in the general clause and not the mini general clauses, appears to be primarily to 
exempt unfair commercial practices that did not influence the consumer’s decision, 
perhaps because the claims were so far fetched that no one took them seriously.
52
  It is 
also designed to exclude from the scope of the uniform European law any regulation 
based on considerations of taste and decency, leaving national legislatures free to occupy 
that field.
53
   However, the materiality requirement also appears to exempt statements 
regarding minor matters that are not commercially significant and do not affect the fitness 
of a product for its normal purposes.  In the Trade Descriptions Act 1968 there was also a 
requirement that the false trade description should be ‘false to a material degree’,54 which 
suggests that the notion of materiality also refers to the degree of error.  For example, if 
the packaging states that a box contains 1000 nails, but in fact the box was one nail short 
of that number, the inaccuracy might not be regarded as ‘material’.  In the common law 
concept of a ‘material misrepresentation’, the requirement of materiality is similar, 
though with the additional element that the claimant must demonstrate a causal link 
between the misrepresentation and the decision that is sought to be avoided.  In the case 
of the Regulations, however, proof of such a causal link seems unnecessary, because the 
general clause only requires the likely distortion of economic behaviour.   
Although the materiality requirement seems reasonably clear in its meaning, from 
a practical point of view it may serve to obstruct enforcement of the general clause.  
Assuming that the general clause is employed as a safety net when the other prohibitions 
do not apply, traders accused of committing an unfair commercial practice will certainly 
try to insist that any impugned aspects of their conduct did not distort the economic 
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50
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behaviour of consumers.  It may prove hard for the prosecuting authorities to produce 
evidence to the contrary.  That difficulty, which may be addressed differently in national 
jurisdictions, may again provoke some divergence. 
 
3.  Misleading Actions 
 
The mini general clauses should provide more determinate guidance for national 
legislation and courts in relation to all the most common forms of unfair commercial 
practices.  The prohibition against misleading actions, which is implemented by 
Regulation 5, commences with a general principle, but then guides its detailed application 
through elaborate rules.  The central prohibition is against a commercial practice: 
(a) if it contains false information and is therefore untruthful in relation to any of 
the matters in paragraph (4) or if it or its overall presentation in any way deceives 
or is likely to deceive the average consumer in relation to any of the matters in 
that paragraph, even if the information is factually correct; and 
(b) it causes or is likely to cause the average consumer to take a transactional 
decision he would not have taken otherwise.
55
 
Regulation 5(4) then provides a long list of the matters about which false information 
should not be given: 
(a) the existence or nature of the product; (b) the main characteristics of the 
product (as defined in paragraph 5); (c) the extent of the trader’s commitments; 
(d) the motives for the commercial practice; (e) the nature of the sales process; (f) 
any statement or symbol relating to direct or indirect sponsorship or approval of 
the trader or the product; (g) the price or the manner in which the price is 
calculated; (h) the existence of a specific price advantage; (i) the need for a 
service, part, replacement or repair; (j) the nature, attributes and rights of the 
trader (as defined in paragraph 6); (k) the consumer’s rights or the risks he may 
face.   
Regulation 5(5) further spells out in a detailed list what may be understood to be the 
‘main characteristics of the product’.  As well as expected items such as the composition 
of the product and its fitness for purpose, it also includes ‘(g) after-sale customer 
assistance concerning the product; (h) the handling of complaints about the product…(p) 
geographical or commercial origin of the product; (q) results to be expected from use of 
the product.’ 
 This level of detail in the mini general clause turns it into an extensive set of 
precise rules, leaving little scope for deviation between national legal systems.  
Divergences may arise, however, with respect to the question of whether the ‘overall 
presentation’ ‘is likely to deceive the average consumer’.  Some legal systems may be 
more solicitous of the consumer who is misled than others, though the application of the 
average consumer test, with its insistence that such a consumer is circumspect, should 
curtail excessive protectionism.  This approach to deliberately confusing statements 
seems much clearer than the prior UK law, which extended protection to statements 
                                                 
55
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which, though not false, were misleading.
56
  The concept of a misleading statement was 
defined as one that was likely to be taken as a trade description that was false to a 
material degree.  This confusing notion of deeming a true statement to be false on the 
basis of its degree of falsehood is replaced by the more precise and relevant question of 
whether the consumer is likely to be misled in the sense of being affected in a purchasing 
decision.
57
   
 Although the prohibition against misleading actions is largely a restatement and 
more detailed elaboration upon the prohibitions in the existing UK laws under the Trade 
Descriptions Act 1968, Consumer Protection Act 1987 ss. 20-26 (misleading price 
indications), and the Control of Misleading Advertising Regulations 1988, in several 
respects the new Regulations are more extensive in their scope.  There is no longer the 
requirement that the false description should be ‘applied’ to goods.58 Under that 
requirement, precedents indicated that a false statement made after a sale of goods had 
been effected did not amount to a commission of an offence.
59
  Under the new legislation, 
a post-sale statement may be an offence, as for example in an inaccurate statement about 
the rights of the consumer in relation to a complaint.  Indeed, the new Regulations pay 
considerable attention to post-sales matters with a view to deterring the ‘customer is 
always wrong’ strategy adopted by some traders.  This practice consists of never really 
dealing with complaints or telling the consumer that he or she needs to take some 
unnecessary or expensive remedial step such as replacement of a part.
60
   The rules on 
misleading prices in the Consumer Protection Act 1987, Part III, did not generally apply 
to the prices of immoveable property,
61
 though estate agents could be prosecuted for false 
statements under separate legislation,
62
 whereas the new Regulations, through the broad 
definition of the concept of a ‘product’, apply to statements and commercial practices 
regarding ‘immoveable property, rights and obligations’.63 The definition of what 
amounts to a misleading price was detailed in the 1987 Act,
64
 whereas the Regulation 
applies the two general tests recited above in Regulation 5(4)(g) and (h).  In so far as the 
1987 Act tries to expand its coverage by, for instance, explicitly including false 
statements that the trader expects the price to go up (when he does not in fact have such 
an expectation), it is possible that Regulation 5(4) may not exactly cover this kind of 
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misleading statement.  However, this kind of deceptive practice is included independently 
in the black list of prohibited practices.
65
 
 
4. Misleading Omissions 
 
Although the prohibition on misleading actions seems likely to achieve a high degree of 
uniformity in the laws of Member States, building as it does on prior legislation and 
fitting fairly neatly into existing national provisions, the ban on misleading omissions 
faces an uphill struggle.  One frequently noted divergence between national legal systems 
is the extent to which they permit liability for omissions.  UK law generally rejects such 
liability in cases, for instance, of a failure to disclose material information.  Departing 
from this principle, and indeed probably going further in this direction than most 
European legal systems,
66
 the Directive introduces the offence of committing an unfair 
commercial practice by a misleading omission.    
Regulation 6.-(1) A commercial practice is a misleading omission if, in its factual 
context, taking into account of the matters in paragraph (2)-  
(a) the commercial practice omits material information, 
(b) the commercial practice hides material information, 
(c) the commercial practice provides material information in a manner which is 
unclear, unintelligible, ambiguous or untimely, or 
(d) the commercial practice fails to identify its commercial intent, unless this is 
already apparent from the context, 
and as a result it causes or is likely to cause the average consumer to take a 
transactional decision he would not have taken otherwise. 
Paragraph (2) explains that the factual context should include the limitations of the 
medium used to communicate the commercial practice (including limitations of space 
and time), taking into account other measures taken by the trader to make the information 
available by other means.  Under this crucial qualification, therefore, the type or mode of 
communication might justify an omission of material information.  Bold claims on a 
chocolate bar wrapper that purchasers might win a luxury holiday, whilst omitting to 
mention the need to satisfy various onerous conditions, might avoid an offence either on 
the ground that there simply was not space available on the wrapper to mention these 
conditions, or perhaps and with greater certainty of avoiding an offence by stating on the 
wrapper that the offer is subject to various conditions that can be discovered easily, for 
instance, on a website.    
 
Duty to Disclose Material Information 
  
The major innovation in this measure from the point of view of UK law is the duty to 
disclose ‘material information’ in Regulation 6(1)(a).  The other examples of misleading 
omissions, such as the provision of partial or ambiguous information, could probably be 
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fitted into the existing notions of misleading trade practices or misleading price 
indications.  In the case of misleading price indications, for instance, the UK legislation 
specified that an indication might be misleading if it omitted information that a consumer 
might reasonably expect to have been included.
67
   Prior consumer protection law has not, 
however, imposed a general duty to provide material information.  Instead, legislation 
identified particular instances where such information had to be supplied.  For instance, it 
was a misleading price indication if a statement, though correct at the time it was given, 
subsequently became false and the trader failed to take reasonable steps to prevent 
consumers from relying on the indication.
68
  There were also sector specific duties to 
provide information, such as the Tourism (Sleeping Accommodation Price Display) 
Order of 1977 that required hotels to post the prices for rooms in the reception area, 
which is now revoked.
69
  
 Under the duty to provide ‘material information’, the crucial question is what in 
any particular circumstance should be regarded as material.  Regulation 6(3) explains that 
‘material information’ is ‘the information which the average consumer needs, according 
to the context, to take an informed transactional decision’.   But what information does a 
consumer ‘need to know’ as opposed to ‘would like to know’? One assumes that such 
material information includes the price and the main characteristics of the product or 
service.  The health and safety risks of a product are also regarded as necessary 
information, though the existing rules on product safety and risks that must be disclosed 
are preserved by the Directive.
70
  With regard to price information, the Code of Practice 
for Traders on Price Indications no longer has effect, but BERR has issued non-statutory 
best practice guidance on pricing, which seeks to comply with the new Regulations.
71
  In 
their guidance on the Regulations, BERR and the OFT suggest other examples of 
material information: the minimum length of a service contract, the need to make other 
purchases in addition to the contemplated transaction, whether or not the product is new 
or second hand, and whether a new television is ready for digital transmissions (i.e. 
warnings of technological obsolescence).
72
  The requirement to disclose what the 
consumer ‘needs’ is an objective requirement in addition to the requirement that an 
average consumer would have been influenced in a transactional decision by the absence 
of that information.
73
  The information must be material in that transactional influence 
sense, but additionally it must have been in the view ultimately of a court also necessary 
information for the consumer to make an informed decision.   It is here that opportunities 
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arise for divergences between national enforcement authorities.  Consider, for instance, 
environmental issues: is it necessary for the consumer to be given information about the 
power consumption of appliances, the emissions of cars, the potential for recycling, or the 
sustainable sourcing of an agricultural product?  Does the consumer need to know 
whether eggs have been produced in factory conditions or from free range chickens?   
National courts will be required to make difficult decisions on such issues as whether 
information about environmental risks and humanitarian concerns was necessary material 
information in the circumstances.  It should be remembered, though, that even if a court 
determines that omitted information was both material and necessary for the consumer, 
the trader may still avoid liability if the medium of communication and other 
circumstances can justify the brevity of the communication. 
 
Invitation to Purchase 
 
The potential uncertainty and divergence created by the duty to provide material 
information to consumers is considerably reduced, however, by more detailed regulation 
of omissions in the most common situation of an ‘invitation to purchase’.  An invitation 
to purchase is defined broadly to include any ‘commercial communication which 
indicates characteristics of the product and the price in a way appropriate to the means of 
that commercial communication and thereby enables the consumer to make a purchase’.74  
This definition includes not only offers to sell, but also ‘invitations to treat’, such as 
putting goods with price labels on display in a shop, a price list in a bar or outside a 
parking garage, or an advertisement for the sale of goods in a magazine that includes an 
order form that can be completed and sent to the trader.    Owing to the broad definition 
of ‘product’, the duty to supply material information applies to goods and services.  In 
relation to ‘invitations to purchase’, Regulation 6(4) specifies that the following 
information will always be deemed to be material: 
(a) the main characteristics of the product, to the extent appropriate to the medium 
by which the invitation to purchase is communicated and the product; 
(b) the identity of the trader, such as his trading name, and the identity of any 
other trader on whose behalf the trader is acting; 
(c) the geographical address of the trader and the geographical address of any 
other trader on whose behalf the trader is action; 
(d) either – (i) the price, including any taxes; or (ii) where the nature of the 
product is such that the price cannot reasonably be calculated in advance, the 
manner in which the price is calculated; 
(e) where appropriate, either- (i) all additional freight, delivery or postal charges; 
or (ii) where such charges cannot reasonably be calculated in advance, the fact 
that such charges may be payable; 
(f) the following matters where they depart from the requirements of professional 
diligence- (i) arrangements for payment, (ii) arrangements for delivery, (iii) 
arrangements for performance, (iv) complaint handling policy; 
(g) for products and transactions involving a right of withdrawal or cancellation, 
the existence of such a right.    
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It is possible, according to the nature of the transaction and the context, that other 
information will be regarded as material to an invitation to purchase: the above list is 
merely a minimum set of requirements.  The Schedule of prohibited practices effectively 
adds an item to this list:  
Making an invitation to purchase products at a specified price without disclosing 
the existence of any reasonable grounds the trader may have for believing that he 
will not be able to offer for supply, or to procure another trader to supply, those 
products or equivalent products at that price for a period that is, and in quantities 
that are, reasonable having regard to the product, the scale of the advertising of 
the product and the price offered (bait advertising).
75
 
In practice, of course, much of this information will be readily apparent without the need 
for the trader to make a special communication.  When purchasing goods in a shop, for 
instance, putting the goods on display with a clearly marked price should normally satisfy 
the trader’s duty to provide information.   When traders seek to sell on the Internet, 
however, they will need to ensure that the above information is clearly displayed or at 
least is readily discoverable by clear links posted to other pages of the website.   
 The most troublesome aspect of the list of material information that must be 
disclosed with an invitation to purchase is likely to be item (f) above.   These are matters 
that only must be disclosed in the communication of the invitation to purchase if they 
differ from what a consumer might reasonably expect from a trader, in accordance with 
honest market practice or good faith.   Suppose, for instance, that the trader provides a 
removal of furniture service and requires payment in advance for the work rather than 
only after satisfactory completion; does the trader have to reveal this pre-payment 
requirement prior to the consumer agreeing to contract for the service?  The answer to 
that question depends rather unsatisfactorily on whether pre-payment is regarded as 
honest or good faith practice in the removal of furniture trade.   Particularly odd is the 
notion of a complaint handling policy that deviates from the requirements of professional 
diligence.  If the trader handles complaints by never really doing anything about them or 
by demanding vast amounts of evidence to back up a complaint that few, if any, 
consumers will bother to satisfy, assuming that this conduct falls below the standards of 
professional diligence, the trader will be under a legal duty to reveal this practice, which 
seems a very unlikely scenario.  It might have been better if the Directive and the 
Regulation had insisted that an accurate description of the complaint handling procedure 
should be material information in invitations to purchase.   More generally, we can 
predict that the unfamiliarity of the concept of a duty of disclosure of material 
information combined with the reinsertion of the vague notion of professional diligence is 
likely to permit considerable divergence between national applications of this regulation. 
 
 
 
5. Aggressive Commercial Practices 
 
Perhaps the greatest innovation of the Regulations from the point of view of UK 
consumer law is the prohibition of aggressive commercial practices.   
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Regulation 7.-(1) A commercial practice is aggressive if, in its factual context, 
taking account of all of its features and circumstances- 
(a) it significantly impairs or is likely significantly to impair the average 
consumer’s freedom of choice or conduct in relation to the product concerned 
through the use of harassment, coercion or undue influence; and 
(b) it thereby causes or is likely to cause him to take a transactional decision he 
would not have taken otherwise.  
The concept of ‘undue influence’ is further defined for this purpose as ‘exploiting a 
position of power in relation to the consumer so as to apply pressure, even without using 
or threatening to use physical force, in a way which significantly limits the consumer’s 
ability to make an informed decision.’76  The Regulations also add that, in determining 
whether a practice is aggressive, account should be taken of ‘the exploitation by the 
trader of any specific misfortune or circumstance of such gravity as to impair the 
consumer’s judgment, of which the trader is aware, to influence the consumer’s decision 
with regard to the product.’77  Taken together with the possible modifications to the 
concept of the average consumer in the case of vulnerable consumers, these provisions 
introduce a general offence that applies not only when the trader behaves in an aggressive 
or threatening manner, but also when the trader deviously takes advantage of a special 
weakness or predicament of the consumer to induce entry into a contract.   An offence 
might be committed under this Regulation, for instance, where an undertaker takes 
advantage of the distress and shock of a recently bereaved person to sell a package of 
expensive funeral arrangements.     
 This welcome reform should catch a number of unsavoury practices that 
somehow slipped through the consumer law net or were inadequately deterred by existing 
provisions.  For example, there were cases reported in the UK media of traders visiting 
the homes of elderly and frail consumers and effectively refusing to leave before a 
contract was signed.
78
  In such circumstances, the consumer would have the right to 
cancel the contract.
79
  Failure by the trader to inform the consumer of the right to cancel 
the contract is itself an offence.
80
 Notwithstanding these protections, the consumer might 
reasonably fear another oppressive visit from the trader and so not exercise the right to 
cancel and not report the problem to the authorities.  As a result, the commercial practice 
would probably go undetected and unpunished.  The new Regulations make it clear that 
the practice itself is likely to be unlawful, which should help to deter it more effectively. 
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 The general concept of aggressive commercial practices represents a novel and 
hitherto unexplored concept in national and European consumer protection laws.
81
  To 
grasp the proper scope of the new offences, it is important to remember that Regulation 
7(1) only applies to aggressive practices that impair freedom of choice and induce 
transactional decisions.  Irritating and annoying practices, such as automated phone calls 
and junk e-mails will probably fall outside the prohibition of Regulation 7(1), because 
they are not likely significantly to impair freedom of choice or induce a consumer to buy 
something; on the contrary, such communications are surely usually counterproductive 
for the trader.
82
  Similarly, threatening or abusive language, though undoubtedly relevant 
to a finding that there has been harassment or coercion,
83
 will not in itself amount to a 
prohibited aggressive commercial practice unless it can be shown to have been likely to 
induce the consumer to take a transactional decision he would not have taken otherwise.  
Although this narrowing of the scope of the new offence by reference to the concept of 
inducing transactions provides some determinacy to the regulation, again the innovative 
character of the law for many European legal systems including the UK creates the 
potential for considerable divergence in interpretations.     
 
 
 
6. The Black List 
 
In the above discussion of the mini general clauses, it becomes clear that the level of 
detail and specificity of the Directive and the implementing Regulation only leaves a few 
areas where the national courts have much scope for striking out in different directions.  
Their flexibility in marginal areas is further confined, however, by the black list of 
prohibited practices.  These examples are not merely illustrations of the mini general 
clauses, but in several instances deliberately expand the scope of the prohibitions 
significantly.  Consider, for instance, the prohibited practices in the black list in Schedule 
1 that fall into the general area of aggressive practices.  
24. Creating the impression that the consumer cannot leave the premises until a 
contract is formed. 
25. Conducting personal visits to the consumer’s home ignoring the consumer’s 
request to leave or not to return, except in circumstances and to the extent 
justified to enforce a contractual obligation. 
26. Making persistent and unwanted solicitations by telephone, fax, e-mail or 
other remote media except in circumstances and to the extent justified to enforce a 
contractual obligation.   
Persistent telephone calls marketing the provision of electricity supplies might not fall 
within Regulation 7, as noted above, but they might be prohibited by item 26 on the list, 
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which is not qualified by the need to demonstrate that the consumer’s ability to make a 
transactional decision was impaired. 
 The black list illustrates a third technique of harmonisation: in addition to general 
principles and specific rules, the Directive seeks to confine national discretion by the use 
of binding examples.  It is as if a court had already set a number of precedents in the 
application of the Directive to particular situations.  The generation of such precedents is 
normally difficult under European law.  Under the procedure for making references to the 
ECJ,
84
 not only can the national courts effectively prevent the ECJ from making binding 
rulings by declining to refer issues of interpretation to the court,
85
 but also the ECJ is 
extremely reluctant to apply its interpretations of European law to the facts of a particular 
case as opposed to offering general guidance on the meaning of the words contained in a 
Directive.
86
  National decisions on the application of Directives and their implementing 
legislation are unlikely to be known or cited in other national courts, and in any case 
comprise doubtful value as precedents.   European law thus lacks what most legal 
systems explicitly or more covertly use as a primary tool to establish certainty and 
predictability in the application of the law: the following of precedent decisions.  By 
providing binding examples in the black list, the Directive on unfair commercial practices 
harnesses this tool for harmonisation, with a view to maximising the prospects for 
uniformity in application of the law.  
 
 
7. Enforcement 
Criminal offences 
 
In discussions in the UK regarding the implementation of the Directive on Unfair 
Commercial Practices, business interests raised the question whether it was necessary to 
employ criminal proceedings as well as the system of injunctive relief, clearly mandated 
by the Directive,
87
 and provided in the Enterprise Act 2002 Part 8.
88
   With only a couple 
of exceptions, however, like the preceding domestic law, the Regulations impose criminal 
penalties enforceable by local authority trading standards officers.
89
 These exceptions are 
the prohibitions against a trader who fails to live up to a commitment contained in a code 
of conduct which the trader has undertaken to comply with;
90
 and two prohibitions in the 
Annex of prohibited practices: 
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11. Using editorial content in the media to promote a product where a trader has 
paid for the promotion without making that clear in the content or by images or 
sounds clearly identifiable by the consumer (advertorial).  
28. Including in an advertisement a direct exhortation to children to buy 
advertised products or persuade their parents or other adults to buy advertised 
products for them. 
It seems that the minister believes that parents should be able to withstand the demands 
of children to purchase heavily advertised junk food, computer games, and toys without 
the help of the prosecuting authorities. 
In response to a concern that the general prohibition against unfair commercial 
practices presents a rather vague offence, this prohibition has the special additional 
requirement of proof of mens rea in the form of intention and recklessness.  For the other 
offences, including the prohibitions in the black list of Schedule 1, the trader has two 
general defences.  Regulation 17 provides the customary ‘due diligence defence’ under 
which the trader can show that the commission of the offence was due to a mistake, 
reliance on information supplied to him by another person, the act or default of another 
person, an accident, or another cause beyond his control, and that he took all reasonable 
precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid the commission of the offence.  
Regulation 18 provides a defence to publishers of advertisements that they did not know 
and had no reason to know that its publication would amount to an offence.  
 
Injunctions 
  
The new Regulations also provide that all the prohibitions should be subject to the 
injunctions procedures, colloquially known as ‘Stop Now Orders’, in Part 8 of the 
Enterprise Act 2002.
91
 Injunctions can only be obtained if the conduct of the trader harms 
the ‘collective interests of consumers’.92  There is a question whether the injunctions 
procedure of 2002 Act may not apply to a ‘one-off’ case of deception that seems unlikely 
to happen again.  In such a case a court might decline to issue an injunction.  The aim 
behind the 2002 Act was certainly to prevent bad trade practices from continuing despite 
the risk of prosecution.  It seems to have been assumed that the phrase ‘collective 
interests’ of consumers would always be satisfied by such forward-looking measures.  
Another concern is that under the statutory framework, the task of seeking injunctions 
was given to particular bodies such as the OFT, various regulators, and the consumers’ 
association known now as a result of reckless re-branding as ‘Which?’.93  These bodies 
were thought to represent consumers in general.  As a result, the injunctive regime is not 
made available to ‘competitors’, as envisaged in the Unfair Commercial Practices 
Directive Article 11(1).  The UK government believes that it has the option under the 
Directive to restrict the enforcers to the existing recognised bodies and not to include the 
possibility of competitors bringing actions for injunctions.
94
  The Regulations do, 
however, amend the Enterprise Act 2002 with respect to the burden of proof in injunction 
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procedures, in order to give the courts the power to require proof by the trader of the 
accuracy of factual claims made in the commercial communication, failing which, the 
court may consider that the factual claim is inaccurate.
95
 
 
8. A Private Right of Redress? 
 
The Directive states laconically that it ‘is without prejudice to contract law and, in 
particular, to the rules on the validity, formation or effect of a contract’.96  Accordingly, 
the Regulations are silent on the question whether individual consumers may obtain any 
private right of redress against a trader who commits an unfair commercial practice.  
There is no provision that transactions formed under the influence of an unfair 
commercial practice should be voidable, unenforceable, or cancellable by the consumer.  
Unlike some previous consumer protection laws,
97
 nor do the new Regulations address 
the question whether or not a consumer might bring a claim for compensation in tort for 
breach of statutory duty.   On these matters, therefore, the Directive does not seek to 
achieve harmonisation.  National legal systems will therefore diverge on the issue of 
whether a consumer has a right to claim compensation for losses caused by unfair 
commercial practices.  Because some legal systems grant the consumer a right of action, 
either for rescission of a contract or compensation for losses for breach of statutory duty 
or in tort, the Directive will end up maintaining and provoking creating new divergences 
between the private law systems of Member States.
98
  For instance, in Ireland, which 
follows closely the English common law, the new legislation provides for a consumer’s 
action for damages, including exemplary damages.
99
  Similarly, in Australia the Trade 
Practices Act 1974 s.82 provides for a claim in damages for a person who suffers loss as 
result of a business having used misleading or deceptive practices contrary to s. 52(1), 
and consumers benefit from a further protection in against ‘unconscionable conduct’ in 
business marketing practices.
100
  Two questions need to be considered: might the 
Regulations nevertheless have some effects on private law; and, should the UK 
government introduce private rights of redress for individual consumers? 
 
Impact on Private Law 
 
It is possible that the UK courts might decide that private rights of redress could be 
implied into the Regulations.  That has happened many times before when the courts 
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have implied statutory torts from health and safety regulations.
101
   But there is a general 
presumption against the view that a breach of a statutory duty gives rise to any private 
law cause of action, unless it can be shown, as a matter of construction of the statute, that 
the statutory duty was imposed for the protection of a limited class of the public and that 
Parliament intended to confer on members of that class a private right of action for 
breach of the duty.
102
  This presumption against a statutory tort is likely to be stronger in 
the context of unfair commercial practices where the losses will probably be mostly 
economic rather than personal injury or property damage.   
Alternatively, the courts may develop the common law in directions that 
harmonise the rules regarding the invalidity of contracts in the laws of misrepresentation, 
duress, and undue influence with the prohibitions in the Regulations.
103
  In some 
European civil law jurisdictions, for instance, it is expected that a failure to disclose 
material information contrary to statutory regulations of this kind will provide a ground 
for avoidance of the contract on the ground of mistake and that other unfair commercial 
practices will amount to the ground of rescission and compensation known as ‘dol’.104   It 
would be odd result, indeed, if the actions of an unscrupulous trader amounted to a 
criminal offence, but the contract obtained by an unfair commercial practice were 
nevertheless to remain fully enforceable against the consumer.  This possible 
development of the common law seems particularly likely with regard to the law of 
duress. 
Under the common law of duress, a contract may be avoided where an illegitimate 
act performed by one party causes the other to consent to the contract.  The precise scope 
of the concept of an ‘illegitimate act’ remains uncertain,105 but it is generally thought to 
include torts involving threats to the person or property and some threats of breach of 
contract (economic duress).  But the illegitimate act can possibly be constituted by other 
wrongs such as breach of statutory duty or a criminal offence such as blackmail.  Given 
that a breach of the Regulations constitutes a criminal offence and that often the 
aggressive conduct may amount to an implicit threat to the person, it seems possible that 
an unlawful aggressive practice that causes the victim to consent to a contract will 
constitute duress, so that the victim may avoid the contract.  The crucial issue will be 
whether the aggressive conduct was an inducement to enter the contract or whether the 
consumer had another course of action available, such as walking away, which could 
have reasonably been taken to remove the coercion. 
  
Introduction of a Private Rights of Redress 
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A private right of redress could comprise a right to rescission or a claim for compensation 
for material (and perhaps non-pecuniary) losses incurred as a result of being misled or 
bullied into a transaction by an unfair commercial practice.  A major benefit of such a 
right of action would be to enhance the possibilities of the enforcement of the new 
standards of the Directive.  It would fit into a broader regulatory strategy advocated by 
the Macrory Review to use a flexible toolkit of measures designed to stimulate 
compliance.
106
  A private right of redress would also serve the goal of restorative justice.  
Similar goals might also be achieved by permitting ‘enforcement undertakings’ to be 
added to the remedies available to a criminal court under the Regulatory Enforcement 
and Sanctions Act 2008 Part 3,
107
 though such a measure would not empower consumers 
in the same way as a private right of redress. But the UK Government is apparently 
concerned that a private right of action might have ‘unintended and adverse 
consequences, by potentially providing consumers with undesirable latitude to sue traders 
and by impacting on the law of misrepresentation.’108  .  
What are these possible consequences?  The answer is that the new right of action 
would in effect create a new kind of private law claim.  The current laws of 
misrepresentation, duress, and undue influence could be supplemented by an action for 
compensation for losses caused by unfair commercial practices.  The existing common 
law is cautious in providing compensation for actions during pre-contractual negotiations.  
It does not accept a general duty to bargain in good faith or with professional diligence 
and it imposes few duties of disclosure of information on businesses.  A private right of 
redress might introduce some significant changes.  For example, it might give the right to 
claim compensation for misleading, but not false, statements.  Similarly, it might give the 
right to claim compensation for failure to disclose material information, a right that has 
been steadfastly denied by the common law judges for centuries.  A private right of 
redress might also create for the first time a remedy of compensation for undue influence 
or aggressive business practices, where the traditional remedy has been confined to 
rescission of the contract and restitution.  The Government has given the task of assessing 
the implications of a civil action to the Law Commission.  Its preliminary advice,
109
 
pending a full report, confirms the complexity of the issue of providing private redress.   
The report notes that the opportunity might be taken to reform the English law of 
misrepresentation, both to rid the law of the unnecessary complexity of the duplication of 
causes of action in tort, equity, and statute, and to clarify the appropriate measure of 
damages.
110
  Such a reform would be welcome, but it would need to address the question 
of the availability of civil law remedies such as rescission for misrepresentation in 
circumstances where the trader has not committed an offence, as for example where the 
trader can rely on a due diligence defence.  With regard to the measure of damages for 
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misrepresentation, the reform would need to consider not only the existing irrational 
distinctions between the statutory measures and the common law measures damages, but 
also assess the possibility of claims for non-pecuniary loss.  For instance, in case where a 
trader misleadingly claims that a ‘scientifically tested’ product will restore hair for men 
or remove wrinkles for women, should the consumer’s remedy be confined to the return 
of the price of the goods or should the consumer receive compensation for 
disappointment as well?   
In connection with liability for omissions of material information, the major 
impact of a private right of action would probably concern the conduct of professionals in 
relation to sales of land and to the conduct of businesses supplying services more 
generally.  The topic of the application of duties of disclosure or implied warranties to 
sales of land may prove to be a more fundamental issue than most governments may wish 
to tackle in view of the experience of the pressure to water down the requirements of 
Home Information Packs.    
In relation to aggressive market practices, a private right of redress would clarify 
the scope of the law of duress and it might introduce a novel claim for compensation.  
Such a claim for damages would be particularly significant in circumstances where the 
‘transactional decision’ induced by the aggression was not one of entering a contract, 
where rescission and restitution might be available, but was instead one concerning such 
matters as the repayment of a debt, or not to take legal action, or not to cancel a contract 
under statutory cancellation rights.
111
  
With regard to the general clause of professional diligence, the Law Commission 
expresses itself unable to assess in its preliminary report how far the common law 
provides private redress.
112
  Indeed, the ramifications of permitting private law claims for 
redress on the basis of the standard of professional diligence seem daunting.  A claim for 
compensation under this heading opens up the possibility that consumers might be 
awarded a remedy for a trader’s failure to bargain in good faith or with due care, a rather 
revolutionary notion in the context of the common law.     
Even from this preliminary advice from the Law Commission, it is evident that 
the interaction between the Directive and national private law systems will provide fertile 
territory for divergence.  Does this matter?  In the context of cross-border trade, a 
consumer might be able to rely on his or her home law to mount a private law claim for 
compensation, punitive damages, or cancellation of the contract that would not be 
permitted in the trader’s home state.113  Although the regulatory rules might be 
harmonised by the Directive, the disincentive for businesses to market their products and 
services abroad might persist in the face of fears that consumers might enjoy unexpected 
rights to redress.  If so, we may anticipate that the European Commission will respond to 
a call from the European Parliament and revert to the topic of harmonisation of private 
law with respect to unfair marketing practices before long.
114
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8.  Harmonisation by Example 
 
We can now return to our initial question: will the Directive on unfair commercial 
practices succeed in producing uniformity throughout the laws of the European Member 
States?   There are three crucial features working in favour of this outcome.  First, the full 
harmonisation requirement compels Member States to review all their current legislation 
in the field of commercial practices in order to determine whether the rules are 
sufficiently comprehensive whilst not being overly protective of consumers.  In the UK, 
the consequent legislative process has effectively rewritten the statute book in the field of 
consumer protection.  In thirteen out of the fifteen Member States that initially approved 
the Directive, their previous legislation with regard to fair trading was founded on a 
general clause,
115
 so they will need at least to introduce the more specific demands of the 
Directive such as the black list. The European Commission will certainly police 
compliance carefully and require even small adjustments of non-conforming laws. 
Second, the three ‘mini-general clauses’ achieve much better specificity than a single 
general clause could have done.  In this respect it is likely to provide more determinate 
guidance than some previous Directives such as the prohibition against unfair contract 
terms.  Furthermore – and this is perhaps crucial – the mini general clauses for the most 
part eschew familiar legal terminology, such as good faith, good morals, honesty, 
misrepresentation, and the like, so that when judges and officials have to interpret them, 
the meaning of the provisions will not be weighed down or guided by national legal 
traditions.   
Finally, the major innovation in the technique of harmonisation consists of the 
black list of prohibited practices.  The Directive on unfair terms possesses a ‘grey list’ of 
terms that will normally be regarded as unfair, but, in principle, terms that apparently fall 
within that list can be rescued by arguments that they do not in all the circumstances 
breach the general clause about unfairness.
116
  In contrast, in the Directive on unfair 
commercial practices, courts and officials are instructed to look only at the list of 
examples.  If a case falls within one of the descriptions of prohibited behaviour, it is an 
offence, subject only to the general defences to criminal charges available for businesses 
such as due diligence.  We have also noted above at several points that the black list of 
prohibited practices appears to have a wider scope of application in some respects that the 
general clause and the mini general clauses.  It can be anticipated that the black list will 
be the first port of call for most courts and administrators when applying the new 
legislation.  Interpretations of the meaning of those factual scenarios will provide the 
meat of the precedents in determining the scope of the legislation.  For the purpose of 
European harmonisation, what will unify the laws is not so much shared interpretations of 
concepts in broad legal rules as agreement on examples of marketing practices that fall 
within the black list.  Consider, for example, the marketing practice of ‘bogofs’ (buy one, 
get one free): is this practice lawful?  The first question to ask is whether this example is 
prohibited in the black list?  Example 20 in the list is ‘Describing a product as ‘gratis’, 
‘free’, ‘without charge’ or similar if the consumer has to pay anything other than the 
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unavoidable cost of responding to the commercial practice and collecting or paying for 
the delivery of the item.’  Using this example, one could argue that unless the product is 
sold at its normal or previous price, the second ‘free’ item is not in reality free, but rather 
the consumer is paying a premium, contrary to the rule.  That conclusion seems 
reasonably clear, so there is no need to turn to the more general prohibition against 
misleading actions, which includes rules against statements of a specific price advantage 
that are likely to deceive the average consumer.  If that prediction of the legal process 
proves correct, the Directive will achieve harmonisation by example rather than rules.   
In these three respects, the Directive presents a much more aggressive approach 
towards harmonisation of national laws than we have witnessed in previous consumer 
measures.  In all but name, this kind of full harmonisation is federal pre-emption.  In this 
instance, the topic concerns regulation of competition in consumer markets, but the 
proposed Directive on consumer rights extends the approach to the ordinary private law 
of contract.  Will these measures achieve uniformity in the application of the law?  
Ultimately, given the divergences in national legal traditions and practices, complete 
uniformity seems an unlikely outcome.  In the case of misleading omissions, for instance, 
English courts are much less familiar than their civil law counterparts with the notion that 
businesses should disclose material information, and as a consequence may adopt a 
narrower view of what information is necessary for the consumer to be given.  
Furthermore, the absence in the Directive of any determination of the private law 
consequences of unfair commercial practices will permit considerable diversity to persist. 
Even so, sceptics regarding the ability of the institutions of the European Union to deliver 
on its goals may discover that this Directive marks a turning-point that will confound 
their criticisms.   
 
 
